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DOUBLE JEOPARDY IN JUVENILE JUSTICE
State v. R.E.F., 251 So. 2d672 (Fla. App. 1971)
A petition was filed in juvenile court against R.E.F., a sixteen year
old boy, alleging that he was a juvenile delinquent on the basis of acts
leading to his arrest for rape and aggravated assault. At the hearing, held
within six days of the petition, the state's attorney requested waiver of
the youth to criminal court. This request was denied, and R.E.F. was
adjudged a juvenile delinquent. He was committed to the Division of
Youth Services for an indeterminate period not to exceed his twenty-first
birthday. Eleven days after this disposition, the state grand jury returned
an indictment against R.E.F. for rape. While in custody on the rape
charge, he sought habeas corpus on the ground that confinement on the
indictment was in violation of the fifth amendment protection against
double jeopardy. Treating the habeas corpus petition as a motion to
quash the indictment, the lower court granted the motion.' The First
District Court of Appeals reversed, 2 held: an indictment subsequent to
an adjudication of delinquency does not offend the guarantee against
double jeopardy even though it is based on the same act which served as
the exclusive basis for the delinquency adjudication. The court grounded
this conclusion on the proposition that juvenile proceedings are civil, not
criminal, and that jeopardy, therefore, cannot be said to attach on an
adjudication of delinquency. 3
The fifth amendment prohibition against double jeopardy has gener-
ally taken the form of a bar to a prosecution for an offense on which an
earlier prosecution was based. This bar would be effective, for example,
when a defendant under a prior prosecution was either acquitted or
convicted; when the prior prosecution was improperly terminated after
1. State v. R.E.F., 251 So. 2d 672, 674 (Fla. App. 1971).
2. 251 So. 2d 672 (Fla. App. 1971).
3. Id. The court also rejected the contention that the indictment violated "fundamental fairness"
required under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The court distinguished a Texas
case in which an indictment of a youth after an adjudication of delinquency was held to be
fundamentally unfair. Hultin v. Beto, 396 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1968). In that case, the juvenile had
been treated for a year in a correctional facility before the indictment was handed down. The court
held that "[a] juvenile cannot be adjudged a delinquent child and held in custody as such, and,
without regard to how he may respond to the guidance and control afforded him under the [Texas]
Juvenile Act, be indicted, tried, and convicted of the identical offense after he reaches the age 17
. . ." 396 F.2d at 217, quoting Sawyer v. Hauck, 245 F. Supp. 55, 57 (W.D. Tex. 1965). The Hultin
rationale did not apply in the Florida situation because in Texas, criminal courts have no jurisdic-
tion over a juvenile until he is seventeen, whereas in Florida the criminal courts can obtain exclusive
jurisdiction over juveniles of any age by means of an indictment. 251 So. 2d at 678-79.
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the jury was sworn;4 or when the prior prosecution resolved an issue of
fact or law inconsistent with guilt of the offense. 5 The double jeopardy
rationale has also been invoked against multiple punishment for the
same offense at one trial. 6
Prior to 1968, the federal double jeopardy protection was not binding
on the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. 7 However, if the state has no double jeopardy clause or its double
jeopardy clause has been held inapplicable to a situation which would
have raised the federal double jeopardy protection had the same factual
case arisen under federal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has treated the
state prosecution as presenting due process problems of fundamental
fairness.8 Benton v. Maryland9 changed this by incorporating the fifth
amendment double jeopardy protection into the fourteenth amendment
and making it binding on the states.
The double jeopardy protection does not operate in all situations to
bar prosecution subsequent to prior judicial action based on the same
conduct. In criminal proceedings, the double jeopardy prohibition does
not bar the state from retrying a defendant whose conviction is reversed
on appeal;10 nor does it bar retrial of a defendant whose conviction is
set aside on collateral attack for error in the proceedings." Under certain
circumstances, reprosecution can follow after a trial judge, in his discre-
4. See, e.g., Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963).
5. Remington and Joseph, Charging, Convicting, and Sentencing the Multiple Criminal
Ofjender, 1961 Wisc. L. REv. 528, 552. This category includes the operation of collateral estoppel,
which has been held to be incorporated into the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment.
Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970). Collateral estoppel "means 4imply that when an issue of
ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be
litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit." Id. at 443. Thus, if one man is accused
of robbing six men in a poker game, and the only issue is the identity of the robber, an acquittal
on a trial for one of the robberies is a bar to prosecution for the robbery of any of the others. Id.
6. Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873). The policy supporting the double jeopardy
protection in the one-trial multiple punishment situation is different from the policy in the two-
trial situation. In one trial, the evil to be protected against is punishing a man twice for the same
act. In the two-trial situation, the issue is harassment, and the evil to be protected against is
prosecuting a man twice for the same act. See Note, Federal Multiple Offense Prosecutions: The
Same Evidence Test and Cumulative Punishment, 1960 WASH. U.L.Q. 98.
7. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.319 (1937).
8. See, e.g., Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1958); Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958);
Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424 (1953).
9. 395 U.S. 784 (1968).
10. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
11. United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463 (1964).
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tion, declares a mistrial, with or without the defendant's consent.' 2 Since
the double jeopardy protection prohibits multiple prosecution (or pun-
ishment) for the same offense, a defendant can be tried successively for
each of several distinct offenses which may arise out of a single course
of conduct.' 3 Furthermore, a defendant in a civil action can be prose-
cuted in criminal court for the same conduct on which the civil action
was based.14
Under the "dual sovereignty" exception, the attachment of jeopardy
in a federal prosecution does not bar state prosecution for a substan-
tively identical offense, and vice versa. 5 However, dual sovereignty does
12. Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364 (1961): Reprosecution after mistrial is not barred if done
for the benefit of the defendant; Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949): Retrial is not barred when
a military court martial was discharged due to tactical necessity in the field; Thompson v. United
States, 155 U.S. 271 (1894): Reprosecution is not barred when the jury was discharged because
one juror had served on the Grand Jury which indicted the defendant; Logan v. United States, 144
U.S. 263 (1892): Reprosecution is not barred when the jury was discharged after 40 hours of
deliberation without reaching a verdict; Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148 (1891): Reprose-
cution is not barred when a mistrial is declared because a letter published in a newspaper cast doubt
on a juror's impartiality. But see United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971): When a trial judge
abuses his discretion in declaring a mistrial on his own motion, the constitutional guarantee against
double jeopardy operates to forestall a trial of the case on the merits. The judge, feeling that
witnesses had not been adequately warned of their constitutional rights even though the government
had assured him otherwise, aborted the trial. The Court in Jorn saw an important difference, for
double jeopardy purposes, between mistrial on the defendant's motion and mistrial sua sponte by
the court:
"... [Tihe crucial difference between reprosecution after appeal by the defendant and
reprosecution after a sua sponte judicial mistrial declaration is that in the first situation the
defendant has not been deprived of his option to go to the first jury and, perhaps, end the
dispute then and there with an acquittal. On the other hand, when the judge, acting without
the defendant's consent, aborts the proceeding, the defendant has been deprived of his
'valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal.' "400 U.S. at 484.
13. See, e.g., Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958).
14. See generally I B J. MOORE & T. CURRIER, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE Part 111 (1965).
15. Federal conviction and punishment of a man previously convicted and punished for the same
act by a state is permissible. See, e.g., Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); United States
v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922). Likewise, there is no double jeopardy problem when a state charge
and conviction follows a federal charge and acquittal. See, e.g., Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121
(1959).
The problem of duplicated prosecutions, constitutionally permissible under the "dual sover-
eignty" rule, has been partially resolved as a practical matter: about 15 states have statutes
prohibiting state prosecutions subsequent to a federal prosecution; and since 1959, the policy of
the Justice Department has been not to duplicate state prosecutions. See Note, Twice in Jeopardy,
75 YALE L.J. 262 (1965), and authorities cited therein.
Similarly, it has been Justice Department policy to avoid multiple federal prosecutions based on
several offenses arising out of a single course of conduct. See, e.g., Petite v. United States, 361 U.S.
529 (1960): the defendant, after being convicted in Federal District Court in Pennsylvania of
conspiring to make false statements to an agency of the United States at deportation hearings, was
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not preclude double jeopardy protection when successive prosecutions
occur in different political subdivisions of a state. " If the conduct on
which a state prosecution is based is the same as that on which a munici-
pal violation is based, the double jeopardy protection applies, since the
municipality's law-making power springs from the state."
Traditionally, jeopardy has not been held to attach as a consequence
of juvenile delinquency proceedings. The rationale has been that juvenile
proceedings are civil in nature, cast in a parenspatriae mold. The protec-
tion against double jeopardy, on the other hand, is a right accorded to
individuals accused of crime, and is therefore inappropriate in the juve-
nile setting.'
The traditional view of juvenile delinquency proceedings was changed
by the decisions of Kent v. United States,9 In re Gault,'2  and In re
Winship.21 In those cases the civil label was held to be insufficient justifi-
cation for denying specific constitutional rights when a consequence of
the juvenile proceeding might be the incarceration of the juvenile. Al-
indicted in the District of Maryland for suborning the perjury of two witnesses at the hearing. The
testimony of these two witnesses was among the overt acts relied on in the Pennsylvania conspiracy
indictment. After his conviction of the latter charge was affirmed and certiorari granted on the
single question of double jeopardy, the Supreme Court granted a motion, filed by the government,
for an order dismissing the indictment. This motion was based on the ". . . general policy of the
federal government 'that several offenses arising out of a single transaction should be alleged and
tried together and should not be made the basis of multiple prosecutions, a policy dictated by
considerations both of fairness to defendants and of efficient and orderly law enforcement.' The
Solicitor General on behalf of the government represents this policy as closely related to that against
duplicating federal-state prosecutions . 361 U.S. at 530-31, quoting Department of Justice
Press Release, Apr. 6, 1959.
16. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
17. Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970).
18. See, e.g., People v. Silverstein. 121 Cal. App. 2d 140, 262 P.2d 656 (1953); Dearing v. State,
151 Tex. Crim. App. 6, 204 S.W.2d 983 (1947). But see United States v. Dickerson, 168 F. Supp.
899 (D.D.C. 1958). revd on other grounds. 271 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1959), holding that the double
jeopardy provision of the Federal Constitution does apply in federal juvenile court proceedings. Also
in some cases decided before Benton. courts held that criminal prosecution of a juvenile who had
been adjudicated delinquent and committed to ajuvenile correctional facility violated "fundamental
fairness" and due process if no consideration was given by the court to the rehabilitative effect of
the committment on the juvenile; see, e.g., Hultin v. Beto, 396 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1968), and Sawyer
v. Hauck. 245 F. Supp. 55 (W.D. Tex. 1965). A discussion of whether the application of the double
jeopardy clause to the juvenile system would have an effect on the operation of res judicata and
collateral estoppel in that system [see Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970)] or whether a contrary
finding would have any effect on the workings of those doctrines is beyond the scope of this
comment.
19. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
20. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
21. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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though the holdings of those cases were carefully tailored to the specific
rights at issue, 22 their rationale makes it difficult for courts confronting
claims of other rights to deny them to juveniles by labelling the proceed-
ings "civil." The "spirit" of Kent, Gault, and Winship suggested to
some courts that the bar against double jeopardy should be a protection
for juveniles in juvenile delinquency proceedings23
There are three factual categories in which the issue of double jeop-
ardy can be raised in the juvenile setting: (1) when successive proceedings
are brought in juvenile court, both based on the same act, (2) when a
criminal proceeding is followed by a juvenile proceeding based on the
same act, and (3) when a juvenile proceeding is followed by a criminal
proceeding based on the same act. In each case, two separate conceptual
problems exist: whether application of the protection against double
jeopardy is appropriate in the juvenile context, and at what point jeop-
ardy attaches, if at all, in a juvenile proceeding.24
In the first category, courts have held, for example, that an unsuccess-
ful hearing, resulting in either a dismissed petition, 25 a declaration of
mistrial, 2 or a non-suit, 27 is a bar to subsequent proceedings against the
juvenile for the same acts on which the unsuccessful proceeding was
based. These courts have based their reasoning on the applicability in
juvenile proceedings of all the protections accorded to criminals on trial,
including the protection against double jeopardy. 28 Implicit in these
22. Kent held that when a statute provides for transfer after "full investigation", a judicial type
hearing is required, 383 U.S. 541 (1966). Gault accorded to juveniles the right to adequate notice,
advice as to right of counsel, confrontation and cross-examination, and the privilege against self-
incrimination, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). Winship applied to juvenile proceedings the evidentiary standard
of "beyond a reasonable doubt" applicable to criminal proceedings, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
23. See, e.g., Anonymous v. Superior Court in and for County of Pima, 457 P.2d 956 (Ariz.
1969); Richard M. v. Superior Court of Shasta County, 4 Cal. 3d 370, 482 P.2d 664, 93 Cal. Rptr.
752 (1971); People v. Brown, 13 Cal. App. 3d 876, 91 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1971), Collins v. State, 429
S.W.2d 650 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968); See also Note, Double Jeopardy and Due Process in Juvenile
Courts, 29 U. P-rr. L. REV. 756 (1968), and cases cited therein.
24. In criminal proceedings, ". . . jeopardy attaches when a person has been placed on trial
before a court of competent jurisdiction under a valid indictment, has been arraigned and has
pleaded, and a proper jury has been impanelled and sworn to hear the evidence." Dangel, Double
Jeopardy in Massachusetts, 16 BOsTON U.L. REV. 389, 391 (1936).
25. Richard M. v. Superior Court of Shasta County, 4 Cal. 3d 370, 482 P.2d 664, 93 Cal. Rptr.
752 (1971); People v. P.L.V., 490 P.2d 685 (Colo. 1971).
26. Tolliver v. Judges of Family Court, 59 Misc. 2d 104, 298 N.Y.S.2d 237 (1969).
27. Collins v. State, 429 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
28. "Juveniles are entitled to the fundamental protections of the Bill of Rights in proceedings
that may result in confinement or other sanctions, whether the state labels these proceedings
'criminal' or 'civil' ". Richard M. v. Superior Court of Shasta County, 4 Cal. 3d 370, 376, 482
P.2d 664, 668 (1971), 93 Cal. Rptr. 752, 756 (1971).
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holdings is the determination that jeopardy first attaches no later than
at the conclusion of the adjudicatory stage.
In Colorado, it has been held that jeopardy does not attach at a
preliminary hearing before a referee, even though the referee recom-
mended dismissal of the petition. 2' The court reasoned that since the
referee's finding has no "final effect" until "approval by the court",
jeopardy does not attach . 3 Presumably, an adjudicatory hearing would
give the referee's finding "final effect".
31
Courts which recognize that jeopardy attaches during delinquency
proceedings for purposes of a bar against subsequent delinquency pro-
ceedings would appear bound to find that it also attaches when the
delinquency proceeding is preceeded or followed by a criminal proceed-
ing based on the same act. One court indicated that the double jeopardy
bar would apply in a juvenile proceeding following acquittal in a crimi-
nal court, but the paucity of opinions dealing with the situation suggests
that such a sequence is rare.12 A sequence occuring more frequently is a
juvenile proceeding followed by a criminal proceeding based on the same
act. The post-Gault cases generally agree in this situation that the pro-
tection against double jeopardy is one of the rights to which juveniles
are entitled, but have not agreed on when jeopardy attaches in the multi-
stage proceeding typical of juvenile justice administration. The issue is
most commonly raised on the state's motion for transfer to adult crimi-
nal jurisdiction, made before the conclusion of proceedings at the dispo-
sitional stage. In California, a transfer made during the dispositional
hearing, after the conclusion of the adjudicatory hearing, was affirmed
over the juvenile's contention that to avoid the double jeopardy prohibi-
tion transfer must be made before the end of the adjudicatory hearing.3
The California court held that "until one court or the other reaches a
final disposition of the case, only a single jeopardy is involved." ' 34 In
Arizona, the point in the proceedings at which the double jeopardy bar
is effective against transfer is the conclusion of the adjudicatory hear-
29. People v. J.A.M., 483 P.2d 362 (Colo. 1971).
30. Id.
31. People v. P.L.V., 490 P.2d 685 (Colo. 1971).
32. People v. Brown, 13 Cal. App. 3d 876, 91 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1971) (dictum).
33. In re Gary Steven J., 17 Cal. App. 3d 704, 710, 95 Cal. Rptr. 185, 189 (1971).
34. Id. This holding appears inconsistent with the determination implicit, in an earlier California
holding, that in successive cases in the juvenile system jeopardy first attaches no later than at the
conclusion of the adjudicatory hearing. Richard M. v. Superior Court of Shasta County, 4 Cal.
3d 370,482 P.2d 664,93 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1971). See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
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ing. Thus, a transfer order made during the adjudicatory hearing is not
barred.3"
In contrast to these cases, the principal case reverts to the traditional
pre-Gault approach, seizing on the civil label to deny the applicability
of double jeopardy to the juvenile situation. It relies strongly on the
limiting language of Kent, Gault, and Winship for support; it chooses
not to embrace what other courts have regarded as the "spirit" of those
cases.
37
Unlike the post-Gault cases with which it is in conflict, R.E.F. was
decided after McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,3 in which the Supreme Court
held that a jury trial is not constitutionally required in juvenile delin-
quency proceedings. The R.E.F. court relied on McKeiver for support,
and to some extent the reliance is well founded. Mr. Justice Blackmun,
writing for the majority in McKeiver, made it clear that Kent, Gault,
and Winship had not, separately or collectively, ruled that all rights
constitutionally assured to an adult are to be imposed in a juvenile
proceeding. 39 To the extent that courts finding the double jeopardy pro-
tection applicable in delinquency proceedings rested their holdings on the
opposite conclusion, their authority is clearly weakened.
On the other hand, it does not follow that because a jury trial is
inappropriate in delinquency proceedings, the double jeopardy protec-
tion is inappropriate as well. The McKeiver Court rested its holding on
the conclusion that a jury trial is not necessary to accurate fact finding
and that it could disrupt the desirable "uniqueness" of juvenile proceed-
ings. Recognition of the double jeopardy protection to bar criminal
prosecutions subsequent to an adjudication of delinquency would in no
way interfere with juvenile proceedings. On the other hand, under the
R.E.F. holding, the criminal justice system can interfere with the juvenile
process at any point, thereby depriving it of its effectiveness. Thus,
neither the holding nor the rationale of McKeiver compels the conclu-
sion that double jeopardy protection should not apply in delinquency
proceedings where confinement might be the result. The lesson of
McKeiver is that the incorporation into the juvenile process of rights
35. Anonymous v. Superior Court in and for the County of Pima, 457 P.2d 956 (Ariz. 1969).
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Anonymous v. Superior Court in and for the County of Pima, 457 P.2d 956 (Ariz.
1969) and Richard M. v. Superior Court of Shasta County, 4 Cal. 3d 370, 482 P.2d 664, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 752 (1971).
38. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
39. Id. at 545.
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traditionally accorded the criminally accused must proceed in thoughtful
steps with independent consideration of each right at issue. The test to
be applied for incorporation looks to, first, whether application of the
right is necessary to the maintenance of "fundamental fairness", and,
second, the extent to which the right can be applied without disrupting
the juvenile process. Neither McKeiver nor cases preceding it offered any
suggestion as to whether the right against double jeopardy would meet
these standards; it is left to the courts to make the analysis using the
criteria suggested there with reference to the right to jury trial.
R.E.F., in relying on McKeiver et. al., without making this indepen-
dent analysis, merely begs the question: is the protection against double
jeopardy a constitutionally required right for juveniles in the juvenile
justice system?
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